The concept of consent lies at the heart of criminal jurisprudence relating to rape in India. Yet, it often becomes complex when emotions, relationships, and promises intertwine. One of the most important Supreme Court judgments clarifying the meaning of consent in the context of a promise of marriage is Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46.
In this case, the Court examined whether sexual intercourse on the promise of marriage amounts to rape if the man later refuses to marry the woman. The ruling continues to guide Indian law even under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which has replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), while retaining the same spirit and principles.
📖 Background of the Case
The prosecutrix and the accused, Uday, were in love for several years. During this relationship, they engaged in sexual intercourse. The woman later alleged that she had consented only because Uday had promised to marry her.
However, when she became pregnant, Uday refused to marry her. Feeling deceived, she filed a complaint under Section 376 of the IPC (now corresponding to Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) alleging rape.
The Trial Court convicted Uday, and the High Court upheld the conviction. He then appealed before the Supreme Court of India.
⚖️ Legal Issues Before the Court
The Supreme Court was called upon to decide:
- Does sexual intercourse on the pretext of marriage amount to rape under Section 376 IPC / Section 63 BNS?
- Can such consent be considered as given under a “misconception of fact” within the meaning of Section 90 IPC / Section 22 BNS?
- Did the accused have fraudulent intent from the beginning when he promised marriage?
🏛️ Judgment of the Supreme Court
After carefully examining the facts and evidence, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts.
The Court held that while consent obtained on a false promise of marriage can amount to rape, it must be proved that the promise was false from the inception – that is, that the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix at all.
If, however, the accused genuinely intended to marry her at the time of their relationship but could not do so later due to unforeseen circumstances, the consent cannot be said to be obtained under a misconception of fact.
💡 Ratio Decidendi
The ratio decidendi or core reasoning of the Court was that:
“A false promise is different from a breach of promise. To constitute rape, the promise of marriage must be a mere hoax, made with no intention of being fulfilled.”
The Court interpreted Section 90 IPC / Section 22 BNS – which provides that consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in law – to require intentional deception by the accused.
In this case, the relationship was long-standing and consensual. The prosecutrix was a mature adult who voluntarily engaged in sexual relations, aware of the implications. There was no conclusive evidence that Uday had fraudulent intent from the beginning. Therefore, the essential ingredients of rape under Section 376 IPC / Section 63 BNS were not made out.
📘 Principle Laid Down
The Supreme Court laid down a principle that continues to guide courts even under the new BNS framework:
- If the promise to marry was false from the beginning and made only to obtain sexual consent, it amounts to rape.
- If the promise was genuine at the time, but the marriage later failed due to other circumstances, it is not rape.
This distinction between a false promise and a failed promise protects genuine relationships from being criminalized while ensuring that deceitful conduct is punished.
⚖️ Significance of the Judgment
The judgment in Uday v. State of Karnataka plays a crucial role in understanding consent under misconception of fact – a concept that continues under both the IPC and the BNS.
The Court took a balanced view: it protected women from exploitation while ensuring that the criminal justice system is not misused in cases of failed romantic relationships.
This decision has influenced later judgments such as Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675 and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that intention at the time of promise is the key factor.
💬 In Simple Terms
The Court essentially drew a line between betrayal and deception:
- Betrayal : when a genuine promise of marriage later fails – is not rape.
- Deception : when a false promise is made only to obtain sexual consent – is rape.
This reasoning ensures that while protecting women’s dignity and autonomy, the law remains fair to both parties and sensitive to the realities of modern relationships.
🧩 Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) remains a cornerstone judgment in Indian criminal law. It establishes that the intention behind the promise is the determining factor for criminal liability under Section 376 IPC / Section 63 BNS.
If the promise was made dishonestly from the start, it constitutes rape under the law. But if it was genuine and later could not be fulfilled, it is a matter of personal misfortune, not criminal offence.
By drawing this distinction, the Court harmonized law, morality, and human emotion – ensuring that the law of rape remains a shield against deceit, not a weapon in failed love.
Also Read : K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra
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